By the time the first F-5Es screamed over the Nevada desert as part of the U.S. Air Force’s then-new Aggressor program, a parallel shadow war was already being fought—one that few knew existed.
Beneath the surface of exercises like Red Flag and Cope Thunder, a covert cadre of pilots was flying the real thing: Soviet MiGs acquired through deception, diplomacy, and sheer audacity.
This is the story of HAVE IDEA—the most secretive and consequential fighter test program you’ve never heard of.
The Aggressor Revolution
In 1972, Tactical Air Command (TAC) stood up the first Aggressor squadron at Nellis AFB: the 64th Fighter Weapons Squadron. Their job? Emulate Soviet tactics with uncanny precision to give American pilots a taste of the real thing. But the jets were American—T-38s at first, then the Northrop F-5E Tiger II, chosen for its resemblance in performance and profile to the ubiquitous MiG-21.
The success was immediate. Demand for Aggressor participation at training events skyrocketed, prompting the formation of a second squadron, the 65th FWS, in 1975. At the same time, similar units were formed at RAF Alconbury in England and Clark AB in the Philippines. The Cold War’s aerial chess match had entered a new phase.
But while F-5s made for worthy opponents, some instructors and graduates of the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis suspected there was more going on. Pilots would disappear for a few days without explanation. Rumors swirled about actual Soviet aircraft being flown somewhere—rumors met with silence or a knowing smile.
They were right.
A MiG by Any Other Name
Unknown to most, a program called HAVE GLIB had been underway since 1970, quietly allowing Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) and select TAC pilots to fly actual Soviet aircraft. At the heart of this effort were a handful of MiG-17s and MiG-21s, originally obtained through Israeli intelligence operations in the late 1960s.
These aircraft were based at Groom Lake—better known today as Area 51—where they were maintained, flown, and evaluated under intense secrecy. In 1973, the program was formalized as HAVE IDEA, which integrated test pilots from AFSC with operational pilots from TAC and the Navy.
Access was tightly controlled. Pilots like Majors Randy O’Neill, Gail Peck, and Captains Joe Lee Burns and Mike Press were quietly read into the program and given opportunities to fly the MiGs against top U.S. fighters. Their task was to understand, document, and disseminate the tactical implications—without revealing where the information came from.
“These weren’t just check rides,” said one participant. “These were full-on tactical flights. One-vs-one, two-vs-two—real fights to see what these jets could do and how to beat them.”
HAVE IDEA: Flying the Enemy
What the Aggressors lacked in authenticity, the Red Hats—AFSC’s secret test pilots—delivered in spades. From 1973 onward, the Red Hats conducted dozens of flights each month, generating priceless data. But it wasn’t just engineers behind the stick.
Many of the HAVE IDEA pilots came straight from the Aggressor squadrons. Once proven, they were “read in” and quietly folded into the black-world operation. They appeared as normal Nellis-based pilots, but occasionally disappeared to “run errands” or conduct “special training.” In reality, they were flying Soviet hardware out of Groom Lake.
The aircraft themselves were kept flying through a combination of cannibalization, ingenuity, and what the Red Hats jokingly called “more with less”—a motto that would become part of their official patch.
The data they gathered informed not only tactics but also classified intelligence products and revisions to Air Force tactics manuals. By 1975, many of these updates were being rolled into the Aggressor syllabus—without anyone quite knowing where the intelligence came from.
The MiG-23 Changes Everything
Then came the motherlode.
In 1977, the CIA—through its station chief in Cairo, James Fees—secured one of the Cold War’s most significant aviation coups: a flyable MiG-23MS “Flogger” from the Egyptian Air Force.
To the outside world, Egypt was still aligned with the Soviets. But in reality, the relationship had soured, and America saw an opening. Fees worked for three years to build the trust required to get a MiG-23 out of Egypt and into American hands.
On his 46th birthday, a U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy landed at a remote Egyptian air base, loaded the disassembled Flogger in darkness, and flew it nonstop to Groom Lake. There, under HAVE PAD, the Red Hats rebuilt, tested, and ultimately flew the jet in tactical trials.
What they discovered stunned them.
“Our intelligence estimates were totally wrong,” said Bob Drabant, an analyst brought into the program to translate raw data into usable EM (Energy Maneuverability) diagrams. “We thought the MiG-23 couldn’t accelerate. Turns out, it could outrun an F-15 in the right scenario. But it turned like a brick.”
These revelations forced a rewrite of U.S. air combat doctrine. Previously, American pilots had been taught to avoid turning fights with the MiG-23 and instead try to outpace it. Now, the opposite was true.
Into the Shadows
HAVE PAD proved to be the tipping point. Over the next few years, at least 17 more MiG-23s arrived from Egypt, along with MiG-23BN strike variants and even a handful of Sukhoi Su-7 and Su-20 fighter-bombers. Each was analyzed, tested, and in many cases flown operationally by U.S. pilots.
But even as the technical data flowed, the program’s operational arm remained covert. The Aggressors continued flying F-5Es, but those in the know had access to much more. Red Hats and select TAC pilots flew real MiGs in engagements against F-15s, F-16s, and Navy F-14s—providing insights no simulator could replicate.
The lessons learned went beyond airframe performance. The MiGs’ cockpit ergonomics, visibility limitations, and engine response times were all studied and fed into training syllabi. The Aggressors improved their simulation of Soviet tactics. Red Flag scenarios evolved. The training got sharper, deadlier.
Still, very few pilots outside the program knew what was happening. When they did, it came as a shock.
“You get on an airplane, fly somewhere, get off, and walk into a hangar,” recalled one pilot. “You say, ‘Holy shit!’ and they laugh and tell you if you talk, they’ll kill you. Then you fly back.”
A Legacy in Red
By the late 1970s, the idea of a dedicated MiG squadron began to take shape. The seeds planted by O’Neill, Peck, and others during HAVE IDEA would grow into the 4477th Test and Evaluation Flight—better known as the Red Eagles—a unit that operated an entire squadron of Soviet jets for dissimilar air combat training (DACT).
But the groundwork had been laid years earlier in the shadows of Groom Lake, with a handful of Aggressors and Weapons School instructors flying black jets under fake tail numbers, using false identities, and logging hours that could never be recorded.
Their work changed everything. Tactics manuals were rewritten. Threat assessments were corrected. And for the first time in the Cold War, American pilots entered combat with a truly accurate understanding of what they were up against.
To this day, few know the names of the men who flew those first MiGs for TAC. Fewer still know how close we came to misunderstanding the enemy—and how a group of quietly audacious pilots and spies made sure that didn’t happen.
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